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INCONSISTENT JUDGMENTS
JOHN C. McCom, II*
I. INTRODUCTION
In instances in which multiple suits with common issues occur or the
prospect of such suits arises there has been a good deal of talk about the
supposed evil of judgments inconsistently resolving the same issue, whether
the issue be one of fact or law.' The danger of inconsistency arises in a
variety of contexts. Sometimes, but not always, something is done to prevent
it. In those cases in which action is taken, its character varies. The preventive
may be issue or claim preclusion applied so that no relitigation of the same
matter in the second suit occurs, or it may be joinder of claims or parties
so that what otherwise would have been dealt with in two suits is disposed
of in one. The preventive may be no more than adopting a predisposition
to judge consistently. The form of the remedy available, especially when
joinder is used, takes different shapes and, accordingly, may be more or
less efficacious. In other words, we are inconsistent in our reactions to the
prospect of inconsistent judicial determinations. Whether this is the conse-
quence of inadequate attention to the problem or reflects appreciated
differences in context is the subject of this article. I hope to show that
there are material differences in the situations in which inconsistency arises
so that some differences in treatment make sense. At the same time I seek
to demonstrate that in some measure like cases of inconsistency are treated
differently and sometimes inadequately. The latter conclusion leads me to
suggest some steps that might be taken to provide further prevention.
Where repetitive litigation does occur, it burdens scarce judicial re-
sources, and this is a problem of increasing concern. In the view of some,
indeed, it is perhaps a more pressing issue than that of inconsistency.
2 It
would be possible, of course, to deal with the inconsistency problem by
providing even more adjudication, for example, to "break the tie ' 3 of
* O.M. Vicars Professor of Law and Hunton and Williams Professor of Law (1990-
92), University of Virginia; Frances Lewis Scholar in Residence, Washington and Lee University
(Fall 1990).
1. See, e.g., Rowe & Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty, Multiforum Juris-
diction, 135 U. PA. L. Rnv. 7, 15 (1986) (listing inconsistency, "whipsawing," and scrambles
for inadequate assets along with cost and delay as injustices arising from duplicative litigation).
The concern is not new. A. VEsrAL, RES JtDicATA/PRacLusioN v-9 to v-10 (1969), cited Lord
Coke as complaining about inconsistent adjudications.
2. This concern seems to dominate the American Law Institute's Complex Litigation
Project. See AmmacAN LAw INsTiUT, ComP.EX LmoATION PROjECT 11-19 (Tent. Draft No.
1, 1989) (emphasizing the burden on state and federal court systems of mass filings of suits
by individual plaintiffs).
3. In fact, the preferred response where a third action follows two inconsistent judgments
is to give preclusive effect to the later of the prior judgments. RESTATmeNT (SEco'D) oF
Ju-Dramitrs § 15 (1982). Thus the inconsistency is perpetuated while further reitigation is
prevented.
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inconsistent determinations by still another proceeding. Ordinarily, however,
the systemic response to possible inconsistency, whether achieved by preclu-
sion, joinder, or predisposition to uniformity, seeks to limit litigation of
the issue common to two suits to one adjudication. Consequently, any
improvement in dealing with inconsistency lightens the burden on judicial
resources of repetitive litigation as well. It must be recognized, however,
that there are cases in which repetition does not produce inconsistency at
all 4 or in which the inconsistency produced by repetition can be thought
benign. In consequence, while eliminating repetition will always prevent
inconsistency, what is necessary to deal with cases where inconsistency truly
presents difficulty will not prevent all repetition. The two problems are not
coextensive.
II. Is INCONSISTENCY SURELY BAD?
At the outset, one ought to ask whether the existence of inconsistent
determinations is always a bad thing. Obviously, if two decisions are
inconsistent, one of them must be wrong.' Without more, however, the evil
does not lie in the inconsistency; it lies in the erroneous decision. Inconsis-
tency is merely a signal that error exists, a symptom of something bad, but
not itself evil. Eliminating inconsistency will not surely cure the error. In
fact, the error may be obscured by joinder or preclusion if the initial
decision is the wrong one. To justify striking at inconsistency alone and
not reaching the error that is the underlying cause, it must be shown that
some harm is caused by the inconsistency itself.
It is sometimes argued that, when inconsistency reveals the occurrence
of error, that manifestation of fallibility saps public confidence in the
adjudicatory process and that inconsistency is thus harmful simply because
of its signal. 6 I think this argument underestimates the ability of the public
to accept the proposition that, as in the rest of life, honest mistakes and
even worse failures sometimes occur in the course of adjudication. My
hunch is that the public is fully aware of this reality and would prefer its
acknowledgement and attempts at reform to cover-up.
4. One would expect that the result of a second adjudication usually is the same as in
the first even though one siding with the loser of the first suit would be expected to alter the
presentation in the second in light of the earlier failure.
5. It is easy to see that opposing conclusions about an issue of past fact must mean
that one of the conclusions is wrong. The same suggestion about predictions of future facts
seems true as well. Whether it can be said of opposing determinations of an issue of law
might be thought more debatable. Two judges may disagree about an issue of law because
they bring a different calculus of values to the problem. At least if the judges come from
different jurisdictions it can be argued that the decisions are not inconsistent because the fact
of different values distinguishes the issues in the cases. On the other hand, it can be said in
this case that one of the value sets must be inferior to the other and that the inferior value
set is wrong. This point of contention is beyond the scope of this article.
6. See 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JURISDICTION § 4403 (1981); A. VEsTAL, supra note 1, at v-12; Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN.
L. REv. 571, 600 (1987).
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Beyond signalling error, inconsistent judgments can result in different
treatment of people who are similarly situated. "Treating like cases alike"
is probably the most commonly advanced justification for preventing in-
consistency.7 While this argument is seductive, I do not think it is ultimately
persuasive in the great majority of cases. A neutral onlooker, finding
disparate treatment of litigants because of inconsistent judgments discom-
fitting, is likely to regard the difference as injurious. Winners do not
complain of it, however; losers do. But in most cases the loser's complaint,
I believe, is not truly about the disparity, though it may be so cast. It is
about losing. That is the injury from his perspective, and eliminating the
disparity is not what he wants. The one case in which this is not so is
where the loser and his winning counterpart are in direct competition. There,
getting rid of the disparity in any fashion may be important to the loser in
order that the continuing competition be fair. For example, different tax
treatment of the expenses of competing businesses would be unfortunate
for this reason. More often, however, difference in treatment is invoked by
the loser, not for its own sake, but as evidence that his loss is erroneous,
the possibility that the other outcome is the wrong one being swept under
the rug. We should regard inconsistency as causing injury on an equality
basis only in the case of competition noted above and not in all cases.
By creating uncertainty, inconsistency is also said to stand in the way
of predictability and thus to hinder planning. 8 The injury of inconsistency
under this argument falls on persons, not necessarily the parties to the
judgments, who wish to regulate their affairs in light of the outcome of
litigated cases. Once again, it is far from clear that this concern reaches all
cases of inconsistency. In many instances there is simply no planning. Few
accident victims, for example, will have made plans based on whether they
would be compensated by the tort system if injured. And in a substantial
number of cases it is possible to plan around uncertainty. Buying insurance
or pricing a product are ways to do that. Doubtless there are some cases
in which one would want consistency to facilitate planning, but this is not
a problem that should lead us always to want to take whatever steps are
necessary to eliminate inconsistency.
These three concerns about inconsistency can be usefully considered in
the context of a strange case of "bankruptcy planning." In In re Tveten9
and In re Johnson'° two Minnesota doctors had invested in the same highly
leveraged real estate development company and had given personal guar-
antees for the company's obligations. When the company defaulted, each
doctor had about $19,000,000 of debt on the guarantees. The doctors
consulted their lawyers who, relying on a case that had allowed a bankrupt
7. See, e.g., AmEmCAN LAW INSTT , PRELuIMNARY STUDY OF CoMPiEx LIIGATION 5
(1987); Schauer, supra note 6, at 595-97.
8. Schauer, supra note 6, at 597-98. Professor Schauer asserts that this is the most
important reason for objecting to inconsistency.
9. 70 Bankr. 529 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987), aff'd, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988).
10. 80 Bankr. 953 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987), aff'd in part, 880 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1989).
1991]
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farmer to sell nonexempt cattle to buy exempt hogs," advised both to
convert significant amounts of nonexempt property to exempt assets. Fol-
lowing this advice, Dr. Tveten acquired $700,000 worth of fraternal benefit
annuities, insurance, and Individual Retirement Accounts. Dr. Johnson
prepaid $175,000 to release liens on his homestead and bought about
$250,000 worth of life insurance, a grand piano, and an $8,000 harpsichord.
Both then filed bankruptcy petitions.
The doctors' creditors opposed giving them discharges from their pre-
bankruptcy obligations on the ground that these conversions of nonexempt
assets to exempt ones were made with an intent to defraud creditors. One
bankruptcy judge denied Dr. Tveten a discharge.' 2 The judge's decision that
the doctor had the requisite intent to defraud was affirmed by the district
court13 and the Eighth Circuit 14 as not clearly erroneous. A different bank-
ruptcy judge, though aware of the first bankruptcy judge's ruling, granted
a discharge"s to Dr. Johnson and the discharge was affirmed by the district
court. 6 The Eighth Circuit affirmed this decision as applied to removing
the liens from the homestead, but remanded the case for further consider-
ation of whether the other conversions were fraudulent. 7 Perhaps there
were distinguishing features. The Minnesota Supreme Court, in an advisory
opinion growing out of Dr. Tveten's case, had held that the unlimited
fraternal benefit exemption violated the state constitution." The Minnesota
court's decision, however, came after the discharge was denied and was
germane only as to whether he could keep the property. The homestead
exemption, limited as to acreage but not amount, had been upheld by the
state court against similar constitutional challenges.' 9 At the surface, how-
ever, one may certainly view the courts' decisions as inconsistent. One
conversion was all right; the other was not.
11. See Forsberg v. Security State Bank, 15 F.2d 499, 502 (8th Cir. 1926) (decided under
the 1898 Act). There was also legislative history under the 1978 Bankruptcy Code apparently
authorizing conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt property interests. H.R. REP. No.
595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 360-361, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMN. NEws 5963,
6316-17.
12. In re Tveten, 70 Bankr. 529, 531 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987), aff'd, 848 F.2d 871 (8th
Cir. 1988).
13. In re Tveten, 82 Bankr. 95 (D. Minn. 1987).
14. In re Tveten, 848 F.2d 871 (8th Cir. 1988).
15. In re Johnson, 80 Bankr. 953 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1987).
16. Panuska v. Johnson, 101 Bankr. 997 (D. Minn. 1988).
17. In re Johnson, 880 F.2d 78 (8th Cir. 1988). The Eighth Circuit attempted to harmonize
the cases by saying that the form of the exemption and its amount were relevant factors in
determining fraud. It is clear that the problem is at its worst where there is no ceiling on the
amount of an exemption. This encourages a debtor to acquire such property for purposes of
exemption rather than need.
18. In re Tveten, 402 N.W.2d 551, 560 (Minn. 1987) (on a question certified by the
bankruptcy court because of creditors' objections to allowing exemptions).
19. The Eighth Circuit cited Title Ins. Co. v. Agora Leases Inc., 320 N.W.2d 884, 885
(Minn. 1982), for this proposition. Johnson, 880 F.2d 78, 82 (8th Cir. 1989).
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Will courts lose credibility on this account? Was the doctor who was
denied a discharge treated unfairly because the other was discharged? In
light of these decisions how can debtors and their lawyers know whether it
is safe to convert nonexempt into exempt property in future cases? Or does
it make sense for courts to continue to examine this difficult bankruptcy
problem case-by-case in an effort to find a wise resolution? Is a little
uncertainty perhaps a healthy curb on greed in this situation? Reasonable
people may well differ in their responses to these questions. If one concludes
that inconsistency was inappropriate here, how should it have been avoided?
Should the decision in the first case have been binding in the second?
Should the cases have been consolidated? With all pending cases around
the country raising the same question? Or are the costs of these preventives
too high? Again, answers may differ. I recognize that it is risky to generalize
from one instance of inconsistency, and I do not mean to be entirely
dismissive of these common objections to its occurrence. At the same time,
it seems to me that the example may serve to demonstrate that preventing
inconsistency for these reasons may not be uniformly desirable.
A class of cases exists, however, in which inconsistency causes direct
injury to a clearly identifiable victim and ought to be prevented on that
ground. I believe that this vice of inconsistent judgments arises when a
litigant is caught between two adverse judgments, one of which, because of
the relationships involved, the litigant should have won. 20 There is no doubt
about the existence of injury in these cases. Moreover, although an error
in one of the judgments lies behind the inconsistency, for this person it
does not matter which judgment is wrong. Regardless of the locus of the
error, he is injured because he has lost in both cases. It seems to me that
this is the kind of situation for which we should be especially on the alert.
Here the costs of preventing inconsistency, to the litigants and to the judicial
system, are always justified by the immediacy and certainty of the injury
the inconsistency inflicts.
III. Tiil REMEDIES
Joinder of claims and parties on the one hand and issue and claim
preclusion on the other are the principal vehicles for preventing inconsis-
tency. 2' Both do so by unifying adjudication, though they achieve that
20. See infra Parts V.A.I., B.I., and D.I. and 2.
21. Writing about multiparty disputes more than a decade ago, I was unable to identify
any other mechanisms, although I then differentiated joinder and consolidation because parties
effect the former and courts the latter. McCoid, A Single Package for Multiparty Disputes,
28 STAN. L. REv. 707, 710-12 (1976). Professor Roger Groot has suggested to me that
inconsistency is sometimes prevented by acquiescence of an institutional litigant, usually the
government, in an adverse decision. He cites as an example the decision of the Federal Bureau
of Prisons to give prisoners sentenced in the Ninth Circuit credit against their sentences for
pretrial time spent in a halfway house as a condition of bond because of that circuit's decision
in Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1990). FEDERAL BuREAu Or PRISONS, OPERATIONS
MEMORANDUM No. 112-90 (5880) (Aug. 29, 1990).
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unification in different ways. Joinder pulls all the parties or claims into a
single action. Preclusion bars relitigation of things already decided. Both
concepts are subject to limitations that get in the way of unification.
The obstacles to joinder are those of jurisdiction and venue. In the
federal courts particularly, the jurisdictional difficulties are compound.
Jurisdiction over subject matter, limited by Article III and further by
Congress, can present problems. The usual requirement of a federal question
or complete diversity between plaintiffs .and defendants, the latter a restric-
tion thought to be imposed by Congress, z2 is sometimes insurmountable.
However, ancillary23 and pendent24 jurisdiction and partial diversity25 provide
opportunities for expansion of federal subject-matter jurisdiction which
might be used to combat inconsistency. Jurisdiction over the person, limited
by due process2 and sometimes further by legislative action,27 can also be
troublesome, and that is true in both state and federal courts. Congress has
made nationwide service available in the federal courts in some cases2s and
22. The source of the complete diversity requirement, which prohibits jurisdiction based
on diversity when a plaintiff and a defendant share common citizenship, is Chief Justice
Marshall's opinion in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). For discussion of
this long-standing interpretation of the Judicial Code, see 13A C. WmoHT, A. M=u.ER & E.
COOPER, supra note 6, at § 3605 (suggesting that Marshall came to regret the position).
23. Ancillary jurisdiction allows a party other than the plaintiff to assert a claim in
federal court which could not have been the subject of an independent suit there. It is the
relationship of this claim to another claim which is properly before the federal court which
legitimates its assertion. Examples are compulsbry counterclaims, Moore v. New York Cotton
Exchange, 270 U.S. 593, 607-10 (1926), and crossclaims that arise from the same transaction
as the plaintiff's claim. See 13 C. WiuoHT, A. MMLR & E. COOPER, supra note 6, at § 3523.
24. Pendent jurisdiction allows a plaintiff to join a claim that could not be the subject
of an independent action in federal court with a factually related claim arising under federal
law. It seems clear that, absent jurisdiction limitations, the two claims ordinarily would be
regarded as one cause of action for claim preclusion purposes. The foundation case has become
United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 721-29 (1966) (joining a state law
claim against a nondiverse defendant with a claim arising under the Labor and Management
Relations Act). See 13B C. WsiGHT, A. MMLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, at § 3567.
25. Statutory interpleader under 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1988) requires only that there be
diversity between two claimants. There need not be diversity between the plaintiff and the
defendant claimants or between all claimants. The Supreme Court upheld this provision as
within the diversity jurisdiction granted by Article III in State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530-31 (1967).
26. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 115-16 (1987);
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291-94 (1980).
27. A state, or Congress for that matter, may choose not to exercise all the personal
jurisdiction authority the due process clauses of the Constitution would allow.
28. Nationwide service in federal courts is now authorized, for example, in actions under
the securities laws, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (1988); statutory interpleader, 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1988);
and the antitrust laws, 15 U.S.C. § 5 (1988). For a complete catalogue of such provisions, see
Fullerton, Constitutional Limits on Nationwide Personal Jurisdiction in the Federal Courts,
79 Nw. U.L. REv. 1, 62-71 (1984) (suggesting that Congressional power is limited). It has
been suggested that Congress could authorize state courts to exercise nationwide jurisdiction
in complex cases, AmiCAN LAW INsrIruTE, CoMPLEx LGATON PRoJEcT 187-94 (Prelim.
Draft No. 3, 1990); it is not clear, however, that Congress can extend state authority to match
its own. Id. at 188.
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might adopt nationwide service for other claims to prevent inconsistency.
Some precedent exists in state courts for personal jurisdiction based on
"necessity." This precedent might be similarly useful,29 but how promising
this concept is remains unclear. Venue limitations can also stand in the way
of joinder. Because venue is largely a matter of statute10 aimed at convenient
location within a jurisdiction, relaxation of venue rules to deal with incon-
sistency is primarily a matter of persuading the legislature to put avoidance
of that threat ahead of defendant convenience.
Preclusion, too, is- constitutionally limited. Here the due process re-
quirement of notice and opportunity to be heard provides the principal
restriction. 31 However, preclusion may be further restricted, usually by
judicial decision, on policy grounds. 32 The former obstacle may be overcome,
in some cases at least, simply by provision of notice and opportunity to
intervene. 3 At least, this would seem to be so as to an absentee subject to
personal jurisdiction. 34 Problems in the latter category require balancing
those policies against the evil of inconsistency.
Finally, the judgment in an earlier action may predispose a later court
to reach the same decision on a common issue. For example, a prior
judgment might be prima facie evidence in a subsequent suit between the
loser and a third party on the same issue.35 As to matters of law, stare
decisis has even greater power to prevent inconsistency betweeri separate
cases. 36 The idea that a court should follow the rule established by an earlier
decision of the same point is ancient. The idea probably is grounded in
part in achieving judicial economy, but its more powerful justification is
like treatment of people similarly circumstanced. The force of the doctrine
is limited to a single jurisdiction and to the same or inferior courts therein.
Even in that confine, the doctrine provides a good deal less than absolute
protection. Ordinarily, stare decisis does not stand in the way of repetition
of argument and decision as do joinder and preclusion, and repetition
29. This suggestion is elaborated, but not very much, in Part V.A.I., infra.
30. Some authority suggests that due process may restrict venue as well as personal
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Aguchak v. Montgomery Ward Co., 520 P.2d 1352, 1356-58 (Alaska
1974).
31. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44 (1940) (nonparty not precluded where not
adequately represented).
32. For example, the Supreme Court in Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989) (discussed
in Part V.A.I., infra) thought it bad policy to impose on a nonparty the obligation to intervene
or accept preclusion by the judgment of a pending case.
33. See AmmmicA LAw INsmnum, ComPLEx LMGATION PROJECT 97-129 (Tent. Draft
No. 2, 1990).
34. See id. at 104 (stating the existence of such a limitation).
35. Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act makes a government judgment prima facie evidence
in a later action by a private plaintiff against the same defendant. This statutory rule was
subsumed by nonmutual offensive preclusion, and in 1980 Congress amended the statute to
make it clear that operation of the broader preclusion rule was allowed but not required. P.
AREEDA & H. HovENAm.p, ANTITRuST LAW 323.2a (1987 Supp.).
36. See Schauer, supra note 6, at 571, 605; Wise, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis, 21
WAYNE L. REv. 1043, 1056-60 (1975).
1991]
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creates the opportunity for different outcomes. Departures from precedent
are frequent enough to justify the conclusion that, while the potential of
stare decisis to prevent inconsistency must be acknowledged, its utility on
this score falls well short of what joinder and preclusion achieve.
IV. T m Two-PARTY PROBLEM
The simplest case arises in the two-party context: when A sues B in
suit #1 and suit #2 pits the same parties against each other once more. For
example, suppose that in suit #1 A sues B for damages for personal injuries
sustained in a collision which A alleges to be B's fault, and A wins. In suit
#2 B sues A for B's injuries on the ground that the collision was A's fault.
If the court allows relitigation and B wins suit #2, both victories are to
some extent neutralized by the inconsistency. Or suppose that in suit #2 A
sues B again, this time for property damage. If relitigation occurs and B
wins, we have the anomaly of liability for personal injury but not for
property damage.
The courts' usual response in this situation is foreclosure of relitigation
by claim or issue preclusion, depending on the circumstances. When B
brings the second suit, a compulsory counterclaim rule, a form of statutory
claim preclusion, in the first forum will bar the second suit.3 7 If no such
rule obtains, issue preclusion will establish that the collision was B's fault
and prevent recovery if contributory fault is an absolute defense. 8 If A
brings the second suit, the court might bar the suit by claim preclusion if
state law considers that personal injury and property damage comprise a
single cause of action, as do most, but not all, states. 39 If the court recognizes
personal injury and property damage as separate causes of action, A will
not have to relitigate B's fault; issue preclusion will establish B's liability.
4
0
Seemingly, then, preclusion works very well to prevent inconsistent deter-
minations in the two-party case.
A notorious Supreme Court decision, Reed v. Allen,4' provides a double
illustration of preclusion preventing the possibility of two-party inconsis-
tency. The holder of rents from land interpleaded Reed (A) and Allen (B)
who were adverse claimants under a will. Reed initially prevailed and then
brought ejectment against Allen to recover possession of the land. In the
second action Reed relied on the construction of the will in the interpleader
decree to establish his claim, and the court rendered judgment in his favor
on that account. The court imposed the result of the interpleader action on
the ejectment action to prevent inconsistency (and to save litigation effort).
37. See J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MnLER, CIVIL PROCEDURE 350, 353-54 (1985);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 22(2) (1982).
38. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
39. Id. at § 24, illustration 1; J. FRIEDENTHAL, M. KANE, & A. MI=ER, supra note 37,
at 631-32.
40. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982).
41. 286 U.S. 191 (1932).
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The case's notoriety, of course, stems from additional facts. Allen had
appealed the interpleader decree. That fact did not deter the court in the
second action from relying on the decree. After the court in the second suit
rendered judgment from which Allen took no appeal, the court reversed
the decree in the first suit, and Allen prevailed in the trial court on remand.
Allen then brought a third suit against Reed, also ejectment for the land.
The Supreme Court ultimately sustained Reed's res judicata plea based on
the judgment in the second action, with Cardozo, Brandeis; and Stone
dissenting. Writing for the majority, Justice Sutherland believed that Allen's
remedy was to have appealed the second judgment.42 Having failed to do
so, he was bound by that judgment. Preclusion thus prevented a result in
the third action inconsistent with the result in the second, although an
ultimate inconsistency remained: Allen had the rents; Reed had the land.
Obviously, the difficulty in Reed arose from the court's giving preclusive
effect in the second action to the first decree while an appeal of the first
decree was pending.
Traditionally, preclusion prevents inconsistency only if the party who is
advantaged by preclusion properly invokes the suit #1 judgment in suit #2.
If the advantaged party does not affirmatively invoke the prior judgment,
relitigation will occur, inconsistency may follow, and the inconsistency will
go uncorrected, for courts do not often raise preclusion on their own
motion. Leaving the matter to the parties makes sense if the adverse
consequences of inconsistency affect only A and B. Arguably, inconsistency
also has the adverse effect on society already noted because inconsistency
reveals the fallibility of the process.
Would a better system allow the court to invoke preclusion on its own
motion? One answer to this question might be that such a change would
not accomplish much because the court in suit #2 has no sure way to know
of the first judgment if the parties do not inform the court thereof. In a
computerized world that answer probably has less force than it once did.
Maybe a better answer is that the benefits to the party able to invoke
preclusion are so great that the party will not often waive the point by
nonassertion. Neither answer, however, shows that such a change would do
any harm. The only argument in that direction that occurs to me, and it is
not a strong one, is that it is important to preserve party control over the
dimensions of the dispute in suit #2. The momentum, I believe, is in the
other direction. It is likely that managerial judges will increasingly initiate
preclusion when a party does not, not so much to prevent inconsistency as
to avoid the burden of relitigation.
43
42. Contemporary analysis suggests different procedures for dealing with this problem.
The loser of the first action might seek a stay of the second action while his appeal of the
first decision is pending or he might make a post-judgment motion for a new trial in the
second action after the first judgment is reversed on appeal. REsTATEmENT (SEcoND) oF
JUDGMENTS § 16 (1982). The dissenters in Reed had thought a third suit for restitution might
be appropriate. Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 203-09 (1932) (Cardozo, J., dissenting).
43. 18 C. Wiomr, A. Msum & E. CooPin, supra note 6, at § 4405. If the issue can
1991]
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It should be added that, quite apart from preclusion, the rules of
permissive claim joinder leading to joinder in suit #1 are likely to diminish
substantially the risk of inconsistency. Consider again the hypothetical. For
reasons of economy, if not fear of preclusion, A is more likely than not to
join his property damage claim with his personal injury claim. 44 B, too, is
likely to counterclaim for his damages where counterclaims arising from the
same transaction are allowed, as they almost universally are.45 On the facts
of Reed v. Allen, we would today expect a crossclaim between the inter-
pleaded defendants to establish who had the right to the land itself.4
Insofar as inconsistency is concerned, the two-party case does not seem
to pose any serious problem demanding reform. The preventives appear to
be well conceived to prevent inconsistency. Ordinarily party action will avoid
inconsistency either by initial joinder or timely assertion of preclusion.
Where the parties do not act, it is probable that courts increasingly will
pick up at least some of the slack by invoking preclusion. It is ironic that
inconsistency is perhaps best forestalled where it is least harmful. Here
inconsistency is victimless. The two-party case is one of those situations
where inconsistency reveals the presence of a wrong determination but does
not identify it. One of the inconsistent decisions is erroneous, but we do
not know which one. There is a victim of that error; but, with the possible
exception of Reed v. Allen, in which Allen seems to have been victimized
by initial error in the interpleader action (if its reversal was sound),, we
cannot tell where the error occurred or who its victim is.47 Joinder and
preclusion serve other values here and are not necessary to prevent incon-
sistency.
V. THMEE-PARTY (OR MORE) INCONSISTENCY
All the other cases of inconsistency involve an additional party or
parties. Suit #1 is between A and B. Suit #2 is between one of them and
C. As will become apparent, the joinder solution is much more apt to be
the solution utilized in these cases. But the cases can take more than one
form, and variation in form turns out to be important.
only be raised by the parties, the public interest in preventing multiplicity or the appearance
of fallibility is in jeopardy.
44. Legislation like FED. R. Cxv. P. 18, a typical contemporary joinder-of-claims pro-
vision, would clearly allow joinder if the claims were deemed separate. In federal courts
aggregation of damages would be permitted even if the personal injury and property damage
components were regarded as separate claims.
45. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(a), (b).
46. See FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g). The transactional requirement is obviously satisfied.
47. Neither loser can show that he is harmed by the fact of inconsistency; he can only
argue that perhaps he has lost a case he should have won and is injured by the loss. The
decision in his counterpart's favor might be seen as evidence supporting his argument, but he
presumably could make the argument that the adverse judgment was erroneous even if there
were no inconsistent judgment.
INCONSISTENT JUDGMENTS
A. Two Claimants against a Single Defender
1. Inconsistent Obligations of the Defender
If A sues B in suit #1 and wins, and C sues B in suit #2 and wins, the
obligations that the two judgments impose on B may be incompatible.
Commonly, this will mean double liability: the court directs B to pay A
and to pay C when B should only have to pay one of them. This happened
to the insurer in New York Life Insurance Company v. Dunlevy.4 In the
first action two competing claimants for the proceeds of a policy were
interpleaded by the insurer (B). Dunlevy (C), who claimed as an assignee,
made no appearance in that action, and the named insured, Gould, (A)
recovered from the insurer (B). Dunlevy then prevailed in a second action
brought against the insurer. The judgment in the first action was held not
to bind Dunlevy because the first court lacked personal jurisdiction over
her.
49
On rare occasion the inconsistency can be even worse. The court directs
B to behave (other than by paying money) in one fashion in suit #1 and to
behave in an opposite fashion in suit #2. Martin v. Wilks 0 could turn out
to be such a case. Black firefighters (A) obtained a consent decree against
a city and a county agency (Bs) which directed a course of affirmative
action in hiring and promotion because of past discrimination. Claiming
that they were being denied promotions in favor of less qualified blacks,
white firefighters (C) then sued the same defendants. The Supreme Court
held that the white firefighters were not precluded by their failure to
intervene in the first suit and remanded for a trial of their reverse discrim-
ination claims, thus opening the possibility of inconsistent determinations
of how the defendants must hire and promote firefighters. Should the
possibility materialize, the defendants will not be abli to comply with both
judgments. Obviously, something would have to be done about an incon-
sistency should courts render conflicting judgments in that kind of case,5'
48. 241 U.S. 518 (1916).
49. The first suit had been instituted in the Pennsylvania state court by a creditor of
Dunlevy seeking to garnish an obligation allegedly owed Dunlevy by the insurer. The insurer
responded by interpleading the named insured and Dunlevy. On Dunlevy's failure to appear
a default judgment was rendered for the named insured and the garnishing creditor took
nothing. When Dunlevy later sued the insurer in California, the insurer's defense was that the
Pennsylvania judgment barred her claim. Not having appeared in the Pennsylvania action,
Dunlevy was free to collaterally attack jurisdiction. Because Pennsylvania lacked personal
jurisdiction over Dunlevy that state's judgment was not entitled to full faith and credit, she
was entitled to litigate the merits, and the insurer had to pay twice.
50. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
51. The black firefighters, who had been victorious plaintiffs in the first suit, were
allowed to intervene in the second action to defend the decrees rendered in the earlier suit.
Consequently, it seems probable that they will be bound if the second action is decided in
favor of the white firefighters and that such a decree would be controlling. In two relatively
recent cases the Department of Labor has been the target of conflicting injunctions. In
NAACP, Jefferson County Branch v. McLaughlin, 703 F. Supp. 1014 (D.D.C. 1989), the
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and something ought to be done in the double liability situation as well.
Indeed, the Supreme Court has ruled at least once that subjecting a B
to the lesser threat of double liability to an A and a C is a denial of due
process. In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsylvania,52 the telegraph
company (B) was faced with competing state claims to escheat unclaimed
money orders. The Court ordered dismissal of Pennsylvania's (A) separate
suit against the company so that a single proceeding could resolve the
conflicting claims of the states, especially New York (C), without imposing
double liability on the company.
The usual response to the problem is joinder of C in suit #1 at the
instance of the threatened party, B. This may take the form of mandatory
joinder, on B's motion a refusal by the court to proceed with suit #1 in
the absence of C.53 Or the response can take the form of allowing B to
proceed against A and C by interpleader, a permissive joinder device. 54 The
distinction is an important one because of the jurisdiction and venue
restrictions on joinder. If the response is mandatory joinder, jurisdiction or
venue problems can prevent suit #1 from going forward. In Western Union,
for example, New York could not be joined in a state court action in
Pennsylvania, 55 but the Supreme Court had original jurisdiction over such
a case.56 The state court action was dismissed so that inconsistency could
be prevented in another forum. If the response is use of a permissive joinder
device, jurisdiction or venue limits may defeat protection. In Dunlevy lack
of personal jurisdiction over one of the claimants left the insurer exposed
to double liability. To some extent, however, these jurisdictional obstacles
can be relaxed. Easing of jurisdictional limits can be found, for example,
in federal statutory interpleader, which allows minimal diversity (it is suf-
ficient if there is diversity between any two claimants), a reduced jurisdic-
tional amount, nationwide service of process, and a capacious venue.17 The
court issuing the first injunction refused to hold the department in contempt for doing what
the second injunction, issued by another court, had required on the ground that the department
had acted in good faith, thus saving the department from a "Catch 22" plight. Id. at 1017-
18. In Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722 (4th Cir. 1986), the Fourth Circuit, entertaining an appeal
from the second injunction, vacated it because it conflicted with the first which had been
issued by a coordinate court. Id. at 727-28.
52. 368 U.S. 71 (1961). It is clear from Justice Black's opinion for the Court that the
state action forbidden is rendition of the judgment and not institution of the suit.
53. E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 19.
54. E.g., 28 U.S.C. 1335 (1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 22.
55. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71, 75 (1961). It is not clear
from the opinion why New York could not be joined in the Pennsylvania action. The Eleventh
Amendment does not bar suits between states, and, at least after Nevada v. Hail, 440 U.S.
410 (1979), one state may be sued in the courts of another.
56. Article III, section 2, gives the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over suits "in
which a State shall be a Party." U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2.
57. For a comparison of statutory interpleader and a proceeding under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 22, see 7 C. WRoIr, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERA PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: CvI 2D § 1703 (1986).
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statute clearly covers the Dunlevy facts. Indeed, that case is said to be what
prompted Congress to provide the federal remedy.
58
The joinder response to the threat of inconsistency in this situation,
then, is pretty vigorous. But it is not foolproof. Mandatory joinder is not
an absolute. For example, if there is no forum where A can join B and C,
the court may decide to proceed in C's absence.59 Nor is interpleader, even
with its relaxed standards, sure to be available. If C is from another
country, for example, nationwide service will not reach him.6° At least
partial diversity is necessary under the federal statute as well, and state
courts are limited in terms of personal jurisdiction; nationwide service is
beyond their power.
Preclusion of C would be a surer means of protecting B, of course,
but it cannot be invoked in most cases. Because C was not a party in suit
#1, C is not bound by that adjudication. There are exceptional cases of
preclusion, cases in which C is said to be "in privity" with one of the suit
#1 parties. 61 There are several forms of privity, and I shall not undertake
to describe them here. Suffice it to say that more often than not there will
be no privity and, on that account, preclusion is not ordinarily useful as a
means of protecting B from inconsistent obligations.
Is further protection needed here? To the extent that joinder and
preclusion fall short one could argue that it is. Providing further protection
is another matter, however. The parties may have exhausted joinder possi-
bilities. There are conflicting constitutional claims. If the threat to B is
intolerable as a matter of due process, perhaps further extensions of
jurisdiction over the person of C are intolerable as well. It might be possible
to argue for an expansion of personal jurisdiction. The underlying theory
would be necessity, and Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank6 could be cited
in support of the argument. In Mullane the Supreme Court sustained the
power of New York to bind nonresident beneficiaries of common trusts
established under its laws, so long as adequate notice was provided, based
on the state's interest in providing a binding adjudication. Essentially the
argument for personal jurisdiction based on necessity involves a balancing
58. See id. at § 1701.
59. See id. at § 1611.
60. In State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 537 n.18 (1967), the
Supreme Court expressly declined to pass on whether Canadian bus passengers injured in a
California accident were amenable in a statutory interpleader action brought in that state. 28
U.S.C. § 2361 (1988) provides only for service on claimants where they "reside or may be
found." Id.
61. See F. JAmmAs & G. HAzARD, CrviL PROCEDURE § 11.22 (3d ed. 1985) (describing
"privity" as based on representation or on substantive legal relationships); J. FRIEDENTrAL,
M. KANE, & A. Miuxn, supra note 37, at § 14.13 ("Persons in a privity relationship are
deemed to have interests so closely intertwined that a decision involving one necessarily should
control another.").
62. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). The case is perhaps better known for holding that service by
publication was insufficient against known parties with a known place of abode when a means
more likely to inform was available. Id. at 318-20.
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of the competing interests and resolution in B's favor. The prospect of such
an expansion, however, may not seem bright as recent Supreme Court
decisions seem to take a restrictive, rather than expansive, view of the
subject.,3 Article III constrains further relaxation of federal subject matter
jurisdiction unless Congress transforms the matter into a federal question.
This, perhaps, Congress could do under the umbrella of the commerce
power. 64
Preclusion is a more promising direction. One possibility is legislation
authorizing giving notice to C of A's suit against B and the opportunity
for C to intervene therein with issue preclusion whether C exercises the
option or not.6 5 The idea underlying this device is that it provides the
requisite notice and opportunity to be heard. The Martin decision presum-
ably would not stand in the way. In that case there was no legislation. The
preclusion argument was simply that C, knowing of A's suit, should be
bound by failure to intervene. The Court rejected a theory that put the
burden on C to identify the need to act. 6 It is not clear, however, that C
could be precluded by a court lacking personal jurisdiction over him.
67
2. Inconsistent Determinations of Multiple Obligations
A second two-claimant model arises when A and C sue B separately
with B winning one suit and losing the other in a situation in which B
63. Notable recent decisions invalidating attempted exercises of jurisdiction against non-
residents served outside the state include Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480
U.S. 102 (1987); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); Kulko v.
Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). The Court's
most recent decision sustaining jurisdiction over a nonresident served while present in the state,
Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990), does not really address the problem
involved here.
64. Cf. AmER C AN LAw IN sTrTrE, PRELMNARY STUDY OF COMdiEx LrriATIoN 188, 191
(1987) (considering the problem in the context of multiforun-multiparty litigation).
65. AmucaN LAw INsTrTE, ComPI x LrGATION PROJECT 97-129 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1990) (proposing such preclusion in multiforum-multiparty cases); Note, Preclusion of Absent
Disputants to Compel Intervention, 79 CoLuM. L. REv. 1551, 1565-66 (1979); McCoid, supra
note 21, at 714-28 (favoring formal joinder); Comment, Nonparties and Preclusion by Judg-
ment: The Privity Rule Reconsidered, 56 CAns. L. Rnv. 1098, 1122-25 (1968) [hereinafter The
Privity Rule].
Section 6 of the proposed Civil Rights Bill, H.R. 1, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991), is
designed to overrule Martin more or less in this fashion. It provides that litigated and consent
judgments or orders resolving claims of employment discrimination will bind those who had
actual notice and a reasonable opportunity to present objections or were adequately represented
by one challenging the proposed judgment or order. They would also be bound if reasonable
efforts were made to notify interested persons. The last two justifications for preclusion,
obviously, go beyond what was rejected in Martin as not authorized by statute and unwise.
66. Although the Court placed its decision on the ground that the structure of the
Federal Rules was based on joinder rather than preclusion, it indicated as well that it thought
that a preclusion model which required the absentee to identify the need to intervene was bad
as a matter of policy. Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
67. A UcAN LAw INsTrruTE, ComPLEx LITIGATION PROJECT 104 (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1990).
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ought to win both or lose both. Suppose the case in which A is driving an
automobile in which C is a passenger and which is hit by another automobile
driven by B. If the possibility of contributory fault barring recovery by A
is put aside, B ought to be liable to both or neither. The mass tort context
is perhaps a more glamorous example because the number of claimants
balloons. The resulting burden on the court system is the aspect of those
cases which rightly gives rise to most of the concern. The facts underlying
Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore"8 provide another illustration. There the
Securities and Exchange Commission (A) sued the company (B) for injunc-
tive relief based on securities fraud and prevailed. Thereafter a private
investor (C) brought a damage action based on the same behavior. Either
the defendant was guilty of a securities law violation or not. Separate
adjudication could have led to inconsistent determinations.
Here joinder is of only limited utility as a response to the possibility
of inconsistency. There is no mandatory joinder at the instance of B on
these facts, though some commentators have argued that there should be.
6 9
B has no way of effecting joinder, other than by seeking consolidation if
both suits are pending in the same forum at the same time.70 In federal
court, transfer from one district to another may facilitate consolidation.
Transfer for trial is limited, however, to a forum where the action might
have been brought originally.7' Permissive joinder rules would allow A and
C to choose to sue together if they both wish to do so.72 If A is unwilling
to join with C and sues alone, C may be able to intervene, again permis-
sively.73 Jurisdiction over subject matter and venue restrictions, however,
are not relaxed to facilitate either joinder of plaintiffs or intervention in
such cases.
Again, preclusion prevents inconsistency in this situation, but only
sometimes and, it seems, almost by chance. If A wins the first suit against
B, C may be able to invoke the prior judgment offensively in the second
suit. At least that is possible in those courts which allow nonmutual offensive
preclusion.74 Parklane authorized this for federal courts. Privity is not
68. 439 U.S. 322 (1979).
69. See Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy and the
Court's Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 809, 842-43 (1989); McCoid,
supra note 21, at 724-28.
70. See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 42(a).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1988).
72. E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 20(a). All that is required is that the claims arise from the
same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences and contain a common
question of fact or law.
73. E.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 24(b)(2). Only a common question of law or fact is required.
Intervention was not an avenue for the investor in Parklane; private litigants may not intervene
in S.E.C. proceedings.
74. Mutuality of estoppel (or preclusion) means that in a B-C controversy B cannot be
bound by the result of an adverse judgement in an earlier A-B case unless C would have been
bound, because of privity with A, had the judgment gone the other way in the A-B action.
See F. JAmEs & G. HAzAw, supra note 61, at § 11.24; J. FRMDENTHAI, M. Kaii, "D A.
MIu.an, supra note 37, at § 14.14.
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necessary because B has had his day in court. Even nonmutual preclusion
may be limited, however. In Parklane the Supreme Court indicated that
preclusion would not be available in cases where C stayed out of the first
suit with a view to getting two chances at recovery, by preclusion if A won
suit #1 or directly in suit #2 if A had lost suit #1.71 On the other hand, no
preclusion of C results if B wins the first suit brought by A; C cannot be
bound because he has not had a day in court.
Serious proposals for reform are under consideration in the mass tort
context. The proposals utilize both joinder (consolidation) and preclusion
(notice and opportunity to intervene) concepts. The former will take advan-
tage of partial diversity, pendent party jurisdiction, nationwide service, and
expanded removal in order to achieve maximum joinder in federal courts,
76
and plans exist as well to facilitate consolidation in state court actions.n
Is this a situation in which we need reform? Probably reform is
desirable, at least in the mass tort context, because of the burdens on the
system and on defenders arising from multiple suits. However, reform is
not required on account of inconsistency except as one is disturbed by
appearances or troubled by the prospect that two claimants may receive
different treatment if there are separate proceedings. These consequences
alone might not be thought to warrant imposition of either expanded joinder
or preclusion. The situation is distinguishable from the inconsistent obli-
gation problem and like the two-party cases. While we know from the
existence of inconsistent judgments that there is an erroneous adjudication
and two claimants were treated differently, we cannot be sure of the identity
of the victim of error. Should B have won both cases, in which case he is
the victim? Or should B have lost both cases, in which case the losing
claimant is the victim? The absence of a clearly identified victim has much
to do with the relatively weak responses to the possibility of inconsistency
in this situation. It may be that there has been little complaint about the
possibility by litigants who either do not see any clear threat from incon-
sistency or see what they perceive to be other, greater threats than the
chance of error in a proceeding in which they have a day in court.
71
A situation posing an analogous problem for B is one involving punitive
damages. It may be that multiple awards of punitive damages amount, in
effect, to double liability. If the trier in suit #1 calculates the award based
on a penalty for the defender's overall conduct and takes no account of
75. Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 331-32 (1979).
76. AmERiCAN LAW INsTTrUTE, CoMPLEx LITIGATION PROJECT Chapters 3 and 5 (Tent.
Draft No. 2, 1990).
77. AmRICAN LAW INsTITuTE, CoMPLEx LToATION PROJECT Chapter 4 (Prelim. Draft
No. 3, 1990).
78. In the absence of bankruptcy, the claimants are in a race to satisfaction if the
defender's assets are insufficient to satisfy all claims. A, racing with C to get satisfaction from
B, will prefer to litigate alone. In some instances some characteristic of C will lead A to
regard him as an unattractive partner. What makes C unattractive may or may not be related
to the issues in litigation.
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the possibility of further such awards to other claimants in other cases and
the triers in suit #2 and suit #3, and so on, do likewise, the total sanction
imposed on B will be excessive.7 9 Strictly speaking, this is not a case of
inconsistency. The different triers may, in fact, be quite consistent in their
assessments. The problem, rather, is one of redundancy, but the situation
calls for protection of B analogous to that provided for double liability
resulting from inconsistency.
B. 'A Defender Turned into a Claimant
1. Liability Over
Still another three-party situation occurs when A sues B who, if held
liable, should be able to recover from C for indemnification or contribution.
If A's suit against B and B's suit against C are conducted independently,
B may suffer a loss he should not have to bear because the issue of his
liability to A is determined differently in the two adjudications.8 0 One
example of this is a case in which C is B's liability insurer and A is the
victim of B's alleged tort. Another is when C is obliged to make contribution
because C, too, was responsible for A's injury. Owen Equipment & Erection
Co. v. Kroger" was such a case. Mr. Kroger was electrocuted when a crane
next to which he was walking came too close to a high-tension electric
power line. His widow (A) brought a wrongful death action against the
utility company (B) which owned the line. The defendant utility had a claim
for contribution against the contractor (C) who operated the crane.
There is no mandatory joinder in this kind of case. The joinder solution
for the problem is impleader, or third-party practice.12 In Owen the utility
impleaded the contractor. This device is permissive; B may implead C if B
wishes but is not obliged to do so. There are some instances in which B is
substantively prevented by contract from joinder of C in this fashion. The
"no-action clause" in liability insurance policies, for example, is frequently
held to bar impleading a liability insurer. 3 Even in the absence of substantive
limitation procedural problems may arise. Interestingly, in the federal courts
limitations on joinder are only partially relaxed to facilitate use of impleader.
Courts generally hold subject matter jurisdiction over B's claim against C
79. AmEPitcAN LAW INsTrruTE, PRELIMINARY STU=Y OF CoMPLEx LITIGATION 85-86 (1987).
80. C. Wuoir, A. MIUER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, at § 4452 (arguing for a
preclusion solution).
81. 437 U.S. 365 (1978). In Medlin Marine, Inc. v. Klapmeier, 540 F. Supp. 232 (E.D.
Ark. 1982), a retailer and a part manufacturer held liable for wrongful death and personal
injuries caused by a defective watercraft sought indemnity from the designer of a portion of
the watercraft who had testified as an expert for the defendants, now plaintiffs, in the earlier
tort action. To establish the designer's liability the plaintiffs relied on the earlier judgment.
The action was dismissed with prejudice because the designer was not a party to the earlier
action. 540 F. Supp. at 254.
82. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 14.
83. See R. KaTON & A. WEDISs, INSURANCE LAW § 4.8(b) (1988).
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to be ancillary to A's claim against B. s4 Accordingly, B may assert the
third-party claim against C though they are citizens of the same state and
B's claim against C presents no federal question so that B could not
independently sue C in federal court. Thus the fact that the utility and the
contractor were both Nebraska corporations did not prevent impleader in
Owen.8" Venue also is probably ancillary. 6 But personal jurisdiction over
C is restricted in the usual fashion.Y If C is not amenable at the forum,
the court will not allow impleader.
In many cases in this category preclusion provides an additional form
of protection for B. That is generally the case when C is B's indemnitor,
as in the case of liability insurance. In such a case, when C defends B in
A's suit, as is usually required by the policy, C will be bound by the
outcome. 8  C's control of the defense constitutes a foundation for preclusion
because C has in fact had his day in court, albeit not as a formal party.
Preclusion also applies if C wrongly refuses to defend B in violation of a
legal obligation to do so.8 9 Here the theory underlying preclusion, in part,
is that the insurer has notice and an opportunity to be heard2 ° This rationale
is probably the forerunner of the proposal, described in Part III and V.A.1,
to bind an absentee who has notice of the action and an opportunity to
intervene. In this context, however, the further justification, that B who
has an incentive to avoid liability to A represents C when B defends himself,
absent evidence of collusion bolsters the rationale of preclusion.91 Of course,
a third basis for preclusion is that it is an appropriate sanction for C's
breach of. the obligation to defend. However, when B and C have a conflict
of interest, such as when A charges B with both covered and uninsured
84. C. WRIOT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRAcncE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D
§ 1444 (1990). No Supreme Court case so holds, but there is a favorable dictum. See Owen
Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1978).
85. Owen, 437 U.S. at 367-68. It was the plaintiff 's attempt to assert a claim against
the third-party defendant that caused difficulty in Owen. Initially it appeared that this presented
no problem because the plaintiff was an Iowa citizen and the third-party defendant was
incorporated in Nebraska. It turned out, however, that the principal place of business of the
latter was in Iowa, a fact not immediately apparent because it was on the west side of the
Missouri River after that stream changed its channel. Id. at 369.
86. C. WRiGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVI. 2D
§ 1445 (1990).
87. Id.; see, e.g., Block Industries v. DHJ Industries, Inc., 495 F.2d 256 (8th Cir. 1974)
(contacts of third-party defendants with forum inadequate to support long-arm jurisdiction
where record showed only that they manufactured and sold to defendant fabric of the sort
causing plaintiff's injury).
88. R. KEETON & A. Wmiss, supra note 83, at § 7.6(e)(4), (5); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
oF JUDGMENTS §§ 57, 58, illustration 2 (1982); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra
note 6, at § 4451.
89. See R. KEETON & A. Wroiss, supra note 83, at § 7.6(e)(4), (5) (1988); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF JuDGMENTs §§ 57, 58, illustration 1 (1982); 18 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E.
COOPER, supra note 6, at § 4452.
90. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF JUDGMENTS § 57 comment a (1982).
91. Id., comment b; 18 C. WRiGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, supra note 6, at § 4452.
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behavior, the notice-and-opportunity and breach justifications disappear,
although B still has the same incentive to avoid liability. And in that case
there is no preclusion as to the matter in conflict.92
What should be apparent is that the threat to B is as great in this kind
of case as it is when two claimants separately assert inconsistent claims
against B, the situation described in Part V.A.1. There is no economic
difference between double liability where there should only be single liability
and residual liability where there should be none. This is another instance
in which B can be a victim of inconsistency per se. If it were clear that
joinder and preclusion worked in complimentary fashion always to protect
B when B acts to invoke one or the other of them, the threat of inconsistency
would not give pause; B could defend himself against it. Unfortunately, as
has been shown, such is not the case, and in those instances B is denied
protection that ought to be available.
Several possible improvements can be suggested. In the joinder direction,
personal jurisdiction over C in the state where A sues B based on a theory
of necessity, if defensible, 93 would make impleader generally available in
state courts. Short of that is expansion of the federal remedy. Just as the
threat of double liability led to federal statutory interpleader, this problem
may warrant provision for an action initiated by B against both C and A
without waiting for A to sue. Essentially, B would seek relief in the
alternative, a determination that B is not liable to A or that, if he is, C is
liable to B. Whether as part of such scheme or simply within the present
impleader framework, nationwide service should be as available as partial
diversity (through ancillary jurisdiction) and relaxed venue already are.
Alternatively, a straightforward preclusion solution probably could be based
on notice to C of an opportunity to intervene. On the substantive side,
there is much to be said as well for abolition of the no action clause in
liability insurance contracts.
2. No Liability Over
There is another class of defender-turned-claimant case. A may sue B
claiming that B caused A injury in suit #1 and B may sue C in suit #2 for
a separate injury sustained by B in the same transaction. The absence of
any legal connection between A's and B's claims distinguishes this case from
the preceding one. Imagine, for example, that A is a passenger in a vehicle
driven by B that collides with a vehicle operated by C. Inconsistent judg-
ments may result if the court in suit #1 finds that responsibility is B's while
in suit #2 the court lays the blame on C. Inconsistency results as well if in
92. See R. KEETON &.A. Wmis, supra note 83, at § 7.6(e)(4), (5); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS §§ 57, 58, illustration 5 (1982). The latter authority asserts, based on the
"independent duty to defend" of the insurer, that the insurer should defend under a reservation
of rights and may be precluded if it simply refuses to defend. Id.
93. See supra text accompanying note 62.
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suit #1 A is denied recovery on the theory that responsibility is C's, not
B's, and in suit #2 B loses to C.
Joinder as a solution takes a different form and is somewhat limited.
As a practical matter, the conflict between A and B will keep them from
joining as plaintiffs. Impleader is not available here because C's liability to
B is not derived from B's to A. However, if A sues both B and C, as A
is likely to do in an automobile case, B can crossclaim against C.9 In the
federal court system it is generally held that the crossclaim is ancillary so
there need be neither diversity between B and C nor proper venue over the
B v. C component. 9 A's ability to join B and C, of course, indicates that
there is no problem of personal jurisdiction. It should be apparent, however,
that all this turns on A's joinder of B and C. Absent that, consolidation
provides the only means of joinder. For consolidation to occur the B v. C
component must independently satisfy jurisdiction and venue.
Preclusion similarly is not a sure solution. It is true that, if B loses in
suit #1, C can invoke that judgment in suit #2 in a jurisdiction adopting
nonmutual preclusion. Here C's invocation of the prior judgment is defen-
sive and less controversial than offensive use as in Parklane.96 It will be of
no utility, however, if B wins suit #1. C, not a party to that suit, will not
be bound by its result. It is not clear that preclusion based on notice and
opportunity to intervene would be helpful here. C is a potential defendant,
not a claimant.97 Would C intervene by asserting a claim for declaratory
relief? That surely would precipitate a counterclaim for affirmative relief
by B. Whether C will be willing to trigger this likely consequence is open
to question. Given C's dilemma, a legislature might be unwilling to impose
preclusion here.
In any event, the inconsistency may not call for any remedy. This is
yet another case in which inconsistency is only a signal of error in one suit
or another and itself causes no certain harm to any one of the three parties.
If a crossclaim or preclusion prevents inconsistency in those cases where B
loses suit #1, the consequence may be only to magnify the effect of error
if that result is erroneous.
C. Claimant-Turned-Defender
Presumably there are also cases in which B sues A and then C sues B.
If C is B's passenger and A is the operator of the other vehicle, this could
94. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 13(g), requiring only that the cross-claim arise from the
same transaction or occurrence as the plaintiff's claim.
95. 6 C. WiuGoT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTCE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
2D § 1433 (1990).
96. The incentive of a claimant to stand aside in suit #1 with the hope of invoking a
judgment in his favor or relitigating if the judgment is adverse is absent where C, the nonparty
in suit #1, is a defender in suit #2.
97. An early proposal to preclude on the basis of failure to intervene expressly included
defenders. See The Privity Rule, supra note 65, at 1128. The A.L.I. proposal for multiparty,
multiforum cases seems limited by its terms to claimants but does not discuss the issue.
AMERICAN LAW INsTITUTE, COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT § 5.05(a)(1) (Tent. Draft No. 2,
1990).
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easily occur. Joinder is unlikely absent consolidation or intervention because
of the conflict between the two claimants. Whether there is preclusion
depends entirely on the outcome of the first suit. B will be precluded in
suit #2 if he loses suit #1 in jurisdictions adopting nonmutual preclusion,
subject to the significance attached to C's failure to intervene in suit #1.98
If B wins suit #1, on the other hand, C will not be bound by that result
absent privity with A. This case is indistinguishable from the one described
in Part V.B.2. Whether B claims or defends first really does not matter,
although the case for precluding B when he loses the first suit as a claimant
is perhaps stronger than when B is precluded by a judgment in a suit in
which he defended.9 As a claimant, B controlled the time and locus of the
first suit and has little basis, therefore, to complain about any inadequate
opportunity to be heard. In any event, inconsistency, again, here is only a
symptom of error, not a trap for B.
D. One Claimant and Two Defenders
1. Liability in the Alternative
Another kind of three-party case involves a single claimant, B, who
should recover from either A or C. If B proceeds against A and C serially,
it is possible that he will recover from neither. In B's suit against A the
court may find that C is responsible and render judgment for A. When B
then sues C, the second court may place responsibility on A and decide the
case in C's favor. A simple example of this situation arises when a passenger
injured in a collision proceeds separately against his driver and the operator
of the other vehicle. The plaintiff's thwarted attempt to amend her complaint
to assert a claim against the third-party defendant-contractor in Owen
Equipment & Erection Co v. Kroger'00 suggests that it might have been a
case in which the plaintiff feared such a result. The Owen plaintiff might
have been unsure whether the death of her husband was the fault of the
utility or of the contractor. Finley v. United States,101 a case recently before
the Supreme Court, seems to fall into the same category. The victim of a
plane crash sued the Federal Aviation Administration in the federal court.
The same plaintiff also sued the city and a local utility in a state court.
The Supreme Court rejected the plaintiff's attempt to amend the federal
suit to add the nondiverse, state-court defendants as pendent parties because
the Court found no congressional authorization for such a departure from
the usual requirement of diversity between the victim and the state-court
98. See supra text accompanying notes 74 and 75.
99. See REsTATE ENT (SEcoND) OF JUDOBGNTs § 29 comment d (1982).
100. 437 U.S. 365 (1978); see also supra Part V.B.1 (discussing Owen).
101. 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
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defendants in the absence of a claim against the defendants based on a
federal question.' °2
The prospect of "falling between the stools," if foreseen, will usually
prompt B to try to join A and C as defendants and claim that one or the
other is liable to him. This he typically is permitted to do. 0 3 As Owen and
Finley demonstrate, in federal courts such joinder is subject to the standard
restrictions imposed by jurisdiction and venue rules.' 4 Permissive joinder
in state court is not a sure alternative. While it would not be true in the
automobile collision illustration, in some cases of this type A and C might
not be amenable to suit in the same forum. Finley presented a different,
but nonetheless fatal, obstacle to a state-court action. The federal court had
exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the suit against the F.A.A. In the
absence of pendent party jurisdiction in federal court, therefore, there was
no forum where the plaintiff could join all defendants.' 0 5
Preclusion offers no help at all in these cases, not even fortuitously. In
the absence of privity between A and C, which is unlikely to be present, if
B loses to A in suit #1, that decision cannot bind C who has not had his
.day in court.
Yet the economic impact on B of no recovery from either A or C is
exactly the same as the risk of double liability of a defender in the
inconsistent-obligation context discussed in Part V.A.1. and the risk of
residual liability in the liability-over context discussed in Part V.B.1. Just
as in those cases, B is a clear victim of the inconsistency itself and ought
to be protected. Jurisdiction and venue restrictions on joinder should be
relaxed as much as possible to permit joinder in order to avoid this. At the
least, Congress should authorize pendent party jurisdiction for both the
Owen and Finley situations. Congress' response to these decisions, however,
has been only partial. The Finley problem has been corrected; Owen remains
the law.'06 Probably we should provide B with something like reverse
102. Although the Supreme Court disclaimed any intention to recede from pendent and
ancillary jurisdiction principles already established, Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556
(1989) (speaking particularly of Gibbs), some authorities had expressed concern that the decision
could have that effect. See, e.g., Mengler, The Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction,
1990 B.Y.U. L. Ray. 247 (1990).
103. E.g., FED. R. CIrv. P. 20(a).
104. 7 C. WaiGr, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACCE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL
2D § 1659 (1986).
105. The doctrine of sovereign immunity may present a similar problem where the plaintiff
seeks to join the United States in a Tucker Act claim and another defendant. Id. at § 1658
(discussing Lowe v. United States, 37 F. Supp. 817 (D.N.J. 1941)).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1367, enacted in October 1990, corrects the problem of Finley, but not
of Owen. Section 1367(a) provides for "supplemental jurisdiction" over claims so related to
claims in a civil action where there is jurisdiction "that they form part of the same case or
controversy under Article III of the United States Constitution." Id. This provision would
allow a claimant suing one defendant on the basis of a federal question to join a nonfederal
claim against another defendant without regard to lack of diversity, the situation in Finley.
Section 1367(b), however, expressly excludes claims by plaintiffs in diversity actions against
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interpleader, including nationwide service, ancillary jurisdiction, and relaxed
venue.
2. Cumulative Liability
The last three-party case is one in which the liability of the two
defendants, rather than being alternative, is cumulative, meaning that both
can be held liable but that the claimant is entitled to only one satisfaction.
The cases fall into two categories, one in which the liability of one defender
is derived from the other's behavior and the second in which liability is
independent.
a. Derivative Liability
Suppose, for example, that C is A's employer who may be liable to B
on that account if A is liable to B. If B proceeds against them separately,
it is possible that B will recover from one but not the other and suffer in
consequence because the party against whom B recovers is judgment-proof.
A slightly different, real-case illustration is Bernhard v. Bank of America
National Trust & Savings Association, °7 where in suit #1 a legatee (B) sued
an executor (A) for misappropriation of a bank account allegedly belonging
to the testator and lost on a finding that the testator had made a gift of
the account to the executor during her lifetime. Thereafter, the legatee, who
had by then become the administratrix of the decedent's estate, brought a
second action against the bank (C). Again, permissive joinder by B of A
and C as defendants is available, but it is limited by standard jurisdiction
and venue restrictions. Conceivably, B might choose not to join in the hope
of having two chances to recover should the first effort fail.
Preclusion is more helpful. In Bernhard the California Supreme Court
held that the second suit was barred by the outcome of the first because
the legatee had had her day in court there. This case has become the
foundation precedent for nonmutual preclusion.10 If B loses to A or C in
suit #1, B will be precluded in suit #2. In fact, it is likely that even in a
jurisdiction generally adhering to mutuality, a loss to A in suit #1 will
preclude B in a second suit against C. In those courts preclusion is based
on an exception to the mutuality requirement growing out of the fact that
persons made parties under Rules 14, 19, 20, and 24, and claims by persons proposed to be
joined under Rule 19 or seeking intervention under Rule 24 as plaintiffs. This would bar
assertion by plaintiff of a claim against a third-party defendant, the situation in Owen.
Ancillary jurisdiction over intervention as of right under FED. R. Crv. P. 24(a), a concept
which had been assumed legitimate by most authorities, is also curtailed by the restriction.
107. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
108. The lustre of Roger Traynor seems to have overshadowed the existence of an earlier,
like opinion of the Delaware court in Coca Cola Co. v. Pepsi Cola Co., 36 Del. 124, 172 A.
260 (Super. Ct. 1934), which Traynor himself cited. Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat. Trust
& Savings Assn., 19 Cal. 807, 812, 122 P.2d 892, 898 (1942).
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C's liability to B is derivative.'0 9 Bernhard could have been decided on this
basis without the more dramatic abandonment of mutuality. Where mutu-
ality prevails, however, a loss to C in suit #1 would not bar B in suit #2
against A. The exception to mutuality operates only when the claimant, sues
the primarily liable party first.
At first blush, this kind of case appears to be another of those in which
inconsistent judgments simply signal the existence of an erroneous decision
which cannot be identified. Seen in that light, the problem requires no
solution for inconsistency reasons. In fact, however, the problem is more
complicated tl~an that. Bernhard, for example, without preclusion, presented
the legatee (B) with two chances to recover, two bites at the same apple.110
Moreover, if the legatee had been allowed to prevail in the second suit, the
prospect of still a third suit, by the bank (C) against the executor (A) whose
liability was primary, loomed. It was to deal with this prospect that the
mutuality exception, which might be called "one-way privity," was in-
vented."' The third suit necessarily will be inconsistent with the result of
the first or the second. One commentator described the situation as anom-
alous for that reason." 2 It is more than that. What makes it so, I believe,
is that the third suit taken with the second presents another case of liability
over which was discussed in Part V.B. 1. If the court holds C liable in suit
#2 because mutuality (without the exception) bars preclusion there, C should
not be vulnerable to losing to A in suit #3. In a sense, it could be said
that, long before the abolition of mutuality, an exception to the doctrine
was created precisely to protect C from becoming the victim of inconsistency.
The invention occurred in the rare three-party case in which preclusion
could be an effective preventive without running afoul of due process
because B had had his day in court in suit #1. Nonetheless, the exception
also reflected judicial willingness to address the plight of a potential victim
of inconsistency in a fashion rather radical for the time. As such, the
example ought to encourage similar procedural reform today, by courts or
legislatures, to prevent similar injuries in analogous cases. However, in
preventing those injuries in other contexts, any reform must be designed
with constitutional obstacles in mind.
b. Independent Liability
When liability is cumulative but independent (no right of indemnity or
contribution), it seems to me that inconsistency presents no problem per se.
109. See Coca Cola Co., 36 Del. at 127, 172 A. at 263. REsTATEMENT OF JUDGmENTs §
96 (1942) (as an exception to § 93, which adopted a rule of mutuality).
110. Bernhard, 19 Cal. 2d at 813, 122 P.2d at 895.
111. Mutuality was said to interfere with the right of indemnity. REsTATEmENT OF JUD,-
mENTs § 96 comment a (1942). It is one-way because C is not bound if A loses but is judgment-
proof and B brings the second suit to get satisfaction'from a deeper pocket. REsTATEMENT OF
JUDGMENTS § 93 (1942).
112. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits of the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STA.
L. R v. 281 (1957).
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Suppose that B claims he was injured by the negligence of both A and C.
In one of separate suits against them it might be found that B suffered a
compensable injury while in the other suit it might be found that he did
not. If, because of this inconsistency, B recovers from one defender but
not the other, one of the decisions is in error, but we do not know which.
Neither A nor C can insist that B join them in a single action because of
the common question. Permissive joinder is available to B on the usual
jurisdiction and venue terms. If B loses the first suit, he might be precluded
in the second suit under the authority of Bernhard. Absent privity, B can
take no advantage in the second suit of a first-suit victory. No one is
trapped by any inconsistency, however; consequently, no special precaution
is necessary to prevent the possibility.
VI. INCONsISTENCY BETWEEN DFFERENT PARTMS
A final class of cases is that in which there is no party common to the
two suits and the parties in one suit are unrelated to those in the other. A
sues B in suit #1, and C sues D in suit #2. The typical occasion for this
situation is when the two suits present the same issue of law with regard
to separate transactions. For example, a number of actions in different
bankruptcies have presented the question whether, for the purpose of
preference recapture, payment by check is a transfer at the time of delivery
of the check or at the time it is honored."
3
Within a single jurisdiction, consolidation of the two suits, if they are
pending at the same time, may prevent inconsistency.1 4 Normally, we would
expect this only at the appellate stage when the focus is on issues of law.
Because of the absence of privity between the party losing the first suit and
a party in the second, preclusion is not an effective preventive of inconsis-
tency.
Even where consolidation and preclusion are inapplicable, stare decisis
may prevent inconsistent judgments. Once a court decides the question, that
decision ordinarily will be followed in subsequent actions in the same court
or lower courts of the same jurisdiction.' While this may be done in part
for the sake of appearances, 16 the primary reason is to treat people in like
circumstances alike." 7 However, stare decisis as a way of responding to the
113. See In re Belknap, Inc., 909 F.2d 879, 883-84 (6th Cir. 1990) (holding, as do most
courts of appeals, that delivery effects the transfer).
114. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 42(a).
115. Professor Schauer would say that I have conflated precedent and stare decisis with
the latter principle applying only to the decisions of subsequent inferior courts. Schauer, supra
note 6, at 576 n.11.
116. Id. at 600.
117. Id. at 595-97. Professor Schauer argues that this justification, unanswerable in the
abstract, conceals the more serious question of the size of categories of likeness. If large,
following precedent is a significant constraint; if small, precedential constraint is small. He
suggests that predictability and decisional efficiency are additional supports for following
precedent. Id. at 596-600. See also Hazard, Preclusion as to Issues of Law: The Legal System's
Interest, 70 IowA L. REv. 81, 82 (1984).
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possibility of inconsistency is not an absolute preventive. In the second suit
a party may persuade the court to overrule the earlier precedent and establish
a different, and presumably better, rule. When the two actions are litigated
before courts of different jurisdictions, although the earlier ruling may be
cited as persuasive, the first ruling is not binding in the second action. The
second court will decide differently if it thinks the first decision unsound.
Thus the state courts are often described as laboratories for solving legal
problems, and we think it good that the court in suit #2 is unfettered by
the decision in suit #1. Similarly, we see instances in which the Supreme
Court seems to hold its hand while a difficult issue is litigated repetitively
by different parties in different circuits. This, too, may be regarded as good
because conflict among the circuits helps the high court to reach the best
possible conclusion when settling the matter.
Because they lack common or related parties, these cases are not ones
in which a litigant can be caught between two adverse decisions with
consequences akin to double liability. The cases bear a much closer resem-
blance to those cases in which inconsistency sigiials error but does not
identify its locus. I think that is a contributing factor to the explanation of
why we allow litigants to urge that precedent be overruled, why we expect
one court to disregard the decision of another regarded as misguided, and
why it sometimes makes sense for the Supreme Court to await multiple
adjudications of the same issue in the lower courts before reviewing one of
them and settling the matter. Repetition in these situations is aimed at the
elimination of error, which must be regarded as ultimately a more important
component of justice than preserving appearances or treating similarly people
in like circumstances.",8 Perhaps the balance struck here should tell us
something about the lack of importance of consistency for these purposes
in the multiple litigation situations involving common parties where no
injury results from the inconsistency itself. Of course issues of law are
usually more pervasive in their effect than issues of fact are likely to be,
and that could add weight to the importance of error correction as to law.
Seemingly at odds with the idea of giving error correction primacy over
consistency on matters of law is the idea embodied in the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments extending issue preclusion to questions of law that
arise between the same parties or their privies in successive suits." 9 This
means that no argument can be made in the second action that the first
decision of law was erroneous. Preclusion is limited, however, to those who
118. Professor Schauer readily acknowledges that one cost of a rule of precedent is
perpetuation of what is conceived to be error, Schauer, supra note 6, at 588; this leads him
to consider that the constraint of precedent need not be absolute, that it might provide a
reason for decision that is not absolute. Id. at 591-92.
119. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). The rule of this section is subject
to exceptions. Id. at § 28. In particular, section 28(2) sets apart instances in which "the two
actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated" and "a new determination is warranted
in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or otherwise
to avoid inequitable administration of the laws." Id. at § 28(2).
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have had their day in court on the issue (or their privies), and even so
limited it can present problems. 12° Perhaps it reflects a belief that not much
new can be expected from one who has already been heard on the point.
Probably it simply shows that preclusion is designed to implement values
other than consistency, such as repose.1
2'
The practice in some federal circuits that a decision of a panel thereafter
will be followed in the circuit by other panels, even as to other parties,
unless overruled by the court sitting en banci2 is more obviously at odds
with the idea of giving error correction primacy over consistency and comes
close to preclusion of nonparties. This practice may achieve economy,
although it surely must increase the number of petitions for en banc hearings,
and equal treatment of those similarly situated. Whether those values should
outweigh error correction as to issues of law is not so clear. The practice,
if rigorously followed, also seems to be on the borderline of a denial of
due process to the party who is adversely affected by the prior decision.
He has no true day in court on his claim or defense. What might be thought
to excuse this is the adversely affected party's opportunity to petition for
en banc review by the court of appeals or for certiorari in the Supreme
Court. In such a petition the adversely affected party has a chance to argue
to the tribunal with power to rectify the matter that the precedent is wrong-
headed. Since denial of the petition can be for nonmerits reasons, it can
be argued that the right to petition does not quite amount to a hearing on'
the merits and is therefore arguably unconstitutional. Pointing the other
120. Two examples are found in two 1984 Supreme Court decisions. United States v.
Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154, 160 (1984) (holding nonmutual offensive issue preclusion inoperative
against the government); United States v. Stauffer Chemical Co., 464 U.S. 165 (1984) (allowing
the private litigant defensive issue preclusion against the government without resolving a
problem arising from a competing precedent involving other parties in another circuit where
the private party did business).
121. One justification for extending preclusion to issues of law is the difficulty of
distinguishing fact and law. J. FRmDENTHAL, M. KkiN, & A. M=lLR, supra note 37, at §
14.10. Professor Hazard defends a qualified rule of preclusion. Hazard, supra note 117, at
81. Suggesting that preclusion was not needed historically, id. at 89-90, he argues that
qualification of the rule is needed under the circumstances of modem judicial structure,
especially in litigation involving a public agency. Id. at 90-93.
122. This practice in the Fifth Circuit led that court to allow intervention as of right to
one claiming development rights on an offshore coral reef in an action brought by the United
States against a competing developer to enjoin development. Atlantis Development Corp. v.
United States, 379 F.2d 818, 828-29 (5th Cir. 1967). Professor Helman says that all of the
courts of appeal are committed to it. Helman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and
Practice of Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. Cm. L. Rnv. 541, 545 (1989);
Bennett & Pembroke, "Mini" In Banc Proceedings: A Survey of Circuit Practices, 34 Canv.
ST. L. Rnv. 531, 536 (1986); Wald, Changing Course: The Use of Precedent in the District
of Columbia Circuit, 34 CLnv. ST. L. Ray. 477, 480 (1986). Professor Hellman notes that
lawyers in the Ninth Circuit do not believe the practice succeeds in producing uniformity.
Hellman, supra, at 543. Although he acknowledges "disarray" in some areas, his own
conclusion, based on a study of the Ninth Circuit, is that inconsistency among panels is not
as frequent and not as important, because it does not affect planned transactions, as has been
perceived. Id. at 595-97.
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way, however, is the analogous proposition that a decision of the Supreme
Court on an issue of federal law will be binding on nonparties in subsequent
proceedings in lower courts although Supreme Court review of the later
decision would be discretionary.
VII. CONCLUSION
Unless one is going to worry about appearances and equality of treat-
ment at the risk of error, the only cases of inconsistent judgments requiring
a remedy are those in which, absent a remedy, a repeat litigant may be
caught between two adverse judgments. This occurs in three contexts: 1)
when the litigant is subjected to double liability; 2) when the litigant is held
liable but is unable to recover over; and 3) when the litigant fails in
establishing liability of one or another of parties alternatively liable. The
injury to him in these cases is the same; he is out of pocket the value of a
single liability. From the perspective of a victim of such inconsistency, this
injury is probably more serious than the burden of multiple suits and cries
out for redress.
No one has conceived an effective preventive other than joinder or
preclusion. Both pose problems. Joinder has jurisdiction and venue obsta-
cles. These can be minimized but probably not totally eliminated. These
obstacles have been minimized in case 1), partly minimized in case 2), and
substantially ignored in case 3). In light of Supreme Court decisions, further
reform to improve the joinder situation in cases 2) and 3) almost certainly
requires legislation. For due process reasons, preclusion, as we know it in
operation, is only fortuitously effective in these cases in the main. Only in
the liability-over context has preclusion been truly useful. The idea of
preclusion based on giving a nonparty notice and an opportunity to intervene
and be heard, however, does offer an alternative to joinder, more promising
where the absent party is a claimant. This solution, too, appears to require
legislation in light of Supreme Court precedent.
Enlarging joinder, preclusion, or both in the ways suggested here has
costs. The relaxation of federal jurisdiction and venue limits would increase
the workload of already busy federal courts. Nationwide service would mean
more expense for some litigants and could have an adverse effect on access
to evidence in some cases. Protection from inconsistency, as opposed to
mere error, seems to me to be well worth these costs. Gauging the effect
on adjudication that will come from expansive joinder is more difficult.'2
Increased use of joinder complicates litigation because it adds voices in the
argument. The additional voices doubtless would take more time. More
important is the fact that they are likely to mean more evidence and more
theories about law and fact. All this may be confusing. It is sure to make
judging harder. On the other hand, it might just make the product better.
123. It must be recognized that even preclusion, if based on notice and the opportunity
to intervene, becomes a joinder device for the invitation to intervene will sometimes be
accepted.
